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COVERAGE AND APPLICATION OF THE ORGANIZED CRIME
CONTROL ACT OF 1970: THE ANTI-RACKETEERING STATUTE
IN OPERATION
In 1970, the Organized Crime Control Act' was signed into law. Its
purpose is "to seek the eradication of organized crime2 in the United

States." 3 The Act elevated local criminal activity4 to the status of federal
crimes in certain situations. In order for the Attorney General to bring a cause
of action pursuant to OCCA, the factual circumstances must indicate a
"pattern of racketeering activity" 5 consisting of at least two substantive
crimes 6 proscribed by the statute. By focusing on a "pattern of racketeering
activity" rather than on a single crime, the Act attempts to isolate and
proscribe the types of activities through which members of organized crime
procure money and thereby to curtail the spread of organized crime itself.'
Once applicable, Title IX8 of OCCA provides that the racketeering activity
can be terminated either through the use of criminal penalties 9 or civil
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1970) [hereinafter referred to in the text as OCCA or the Act].
2. I.I.T. RESEARCH INST., A STUDY OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA 18 (1971) adopted the
following definition of organized crime:
Organized crime consists of the participation of persons and groups of persons
(organized either formally or informally) in transactions characterized by:
(1)An intent to commit, or the actual commission of, substantive crimes;
(2) A conspiracy to execute these crimes;
(3) A persistence of this conspiracy through time (at least one year) or the intent
that this conspiracy should persist through time;
(4) The acquisition of substantial power or money, and the seeking of a high
degree of political or economic security, as primary motivations.
3. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1976) (Statement of Findings and Purpose):
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United
States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to
deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1970) defines racketeering activity as " any act or threat
involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic
or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year" (emphasis added).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1970) states that a " 'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this
chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment)
after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity .
6. See note 4 supra.
7. United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1019 (D. Md. 1976), explains this approach
toward combating organized crime in the face of the failure of "traditional criminal statutes" to
curtail its activities:
Rather than attempt to define "organized crime" and make membership therein
unlawful, a task which would undoubtedly have been impossible and probably
unconstitutional, Congress defined an unlawful pattern of racketeering activity in
terms of the types of crimes and behavior commonly engaged in by organized crime in
attempts to seize interests in legitimate businesses.
8. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1970).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1970). See text accompanying notes 80-82 infra.
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sanctions. 10 Equitable procedures were added to customary criminal penalties
in order to "provide [the courts] needed flexibility and continuing jurisdiction
2
1
to assure effective enforcement"" I of the Act.'
Nevertheless, courts have experienced considerable difficulty in enforcing OCCA. The most serious problems with implementing the Act stem from
the discrepancies between the limited congressional intent expressed in the
legislative history and the expansive language of the statute itself. Characteristically, courts interpret the scope and application of a statute in light of its
legislative history. Since the legislative history and the statutory language of
OCCA do not concur, opposing decisions on the scope of OCCA coverage
have resulted from the courts' use of this analytical approach. In those cases in
which courts have held that OCCA was applicable, they have encountered the
further challenge of interpreting and implementing the title IX remedies
provisions. Neither the legislative history nor the statutory language provides
standards by which injunctions are to be issued pursuant to the remedies
sections. For this reason, courts have found OCCA difficult to apply.
This article will contain a general discussion of OCCA emphasizing the
discrepancies between the legislative history and the statutory language
which have generated inconsistent judicial interpretations. It will examine the
various interpretations of OCCA coverage. It will analyze the problems
created by the sparse legislative history which courts encounter in applying
the remedies sections and the ramifications of the courts' solutions of these
problems in terms of the Act's purpose. Finally, this article will suggest
methods of implementing these sections.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND STATUTORY LANGUAGE

The legislative history of title IX of the OCCA is consistent and brief. '3
The hearings on this title of the Act clearly indicate a congressional intent that
the statute be specifically aimed at combating the infiltration of legitimate
business by organized crime. The statement of findings and purposes accompanying the Act embodies this concern and articulates the fear that the
techniques of force, fraud, and corruption employed by organized crime
members are "increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business
and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes." 1 4 The
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1970). See text following note 82 infra.
11. Hearings on S. 30 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,91 st
Cong., 2d Sess. 291, 403 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings].
12. S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1969) includes the following statement:
"Title IX thus brings to bear on the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate business or
other organizations the full panoply of civil remedies."
13. See 1970 Hearings,note 11 supra;S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 157 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings]; H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1970)
reprinted in [19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4007.
14. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (Statement of Findings and Purpose):
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consensus of the Senate Judiciary Committee was that the civil remedies are
aimed at the protection of legitimate business from these forces. I5 The House
Judiciary report describes title IX as "designed to inhibit the infiltration of
legitimate business by organized crime." 1 6 Such concern for the catastrophic
effect of organized crime on society is contained throughout the congressional
hearings and reflects the climate of thought which generated the enactment of
OCCA.
However, despite repeated references in the legislative history to the
protection of legitimate business, the Act as drafted fails to articulate this
overwhelming concern. The restricted congressional purpose that the Act halt
the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate business in the United
States' 7 was similarly not incorporated in the express language of the statute.
Instead, the statute regulates the use of money derived from a pattern of
racketeering in conducting the affairs of "any enterprise" 1 8 and does not
refer to organized crime. The statutory language likewise seems to delete the
requirement of the legislative history that the enterprise be "infiltrated."
According to the statute, it is sufficient that the affairs of the enterprise be
conducted or maintained through a "pattern of racketeering activity."' 9
Coupled with this all-encompassing statutory language is the interpretative
guideline to the judiciary that: "[t]he provisions of this title shall be liberally
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from
America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud and
corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money
obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft
and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other
dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are
increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to
subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities in the
United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent
investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously
burden interstate commerce, threaten domestic security, and undermine the general
welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow
because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions
or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and
because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily
limited in scope and impact ....
15. See 1969 Hearings, supra note 13, at 157.
16. See 1970 Hearings, supra note 11, at 170,
17. See note 3 supra.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest
in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through
a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
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20
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. "
The legislative history implies a limitation on the application of the Act
to organized crime and legitimate business. The statute, on the other hand,
speaks of money from a "pattern of racketeering" being used in "any
enterprise" both of which terms are to be liberally construed. As a result of
these discrepancies, courts basing their reasoning on the legislative history
interpret OCCA narrowly while those courts using the statutory language as
their rationale interpret the Act broadly.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF OCCA COVERAGE

Courts have defined the coverage of the Organized Crime Control Act in
three areas. The threshold question suggested by the specified purpose of the
Act and its legislative history is whether a connection with organized crime
must be established to bring a cause of action thereunder. The second issue is
whether the term "any enterprise" of the statutory language is limited to
legitimate enterprises consistent with the legislative history or can be broadly
construed to include non-legitimate activity. The final issue is whether a
governmental entity constitutes an enterprise within the meaning of the Act.
Connection with Organized Crime
The issue of whether OCCA requires the establishment of a connection
between the defendants and organized crime was addressed initially in United
States v. Amato.2 The court reasoned that since the statute required proof of
at least two criminal acts to establish the necessary pattern of racketeering
activity, merely proving a connection with organized crime was insufficient
to bring the statute into play. Thus, the Amato court rejected defendants'
argument that the statute was unconstitutional because one could violate it
simply by being "reputed to be an organized crime member.'"22 The court did
not specifically decide whether a connection with organized crime was
needed in addition to the crime necessary to establish a pattern of racketeering
to maintain a cause of action under OCCA.
A year and a half later, in Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc.,23 the same district
court addressed the latter issue. In Barrthe defendant had conspired to fix
prices, had overcharged its customers throughout the United States, and had
used the mail to collect the overcharge. Despite these facts, the court refused
to allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint to include a claim under OCCA.
The court conceded that the alleged mail fraud probably constituted a pattern
20. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 (Supp. 1976)
reprinting § 904(a).
21. 367 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
22. Id. at 548.
23. 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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of racketeering as described in the Act. However, since there was "nothing in
the proposed complaint even to suggest that defendant [was] connected in any
way with organized crime," 2 4 the motion was denied as a claim which lacked
merit. The court justified its decision on an analysis of the legislative history
and the fact that the Act, in the words of the then Attorney General, was aimed
at "combating a society of criminals who seek to operate outside of the
control of the American people and their governments. "25 Since the record
did not indicate that the defendant had been involved in such a society, the
statute was held inapplicable.
The contrary position was advanced in United States v. Mandel.26 The
defendant challenged his indictment under OCCA by asserting that the statute
was confined solely to members of organized crime. The court noted that even
though organized crime may have been the principal concern of Congress in
enacting the statute; it was not the only concern. Rather, the fact that the term
organized crime is neither used nor defined in the Act engenders the
interpretation that a broader base and application was anticipated, reasoned
the court. Otherwise, proof of association with organized crime would be a
prerequisite for the applicability of the statute. 27 The court stated that "to
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant was a member of
'organized crime,' with the highly subjective and prejudicial connotations of
that term, would simply render the statute unenforceable, a result plainly not
in the contemplation of Congress." 28 Furthermore, Congress understood the
statute would not be applied "exclusively to members of organized crime.'"29
Thus, the court held the reverse of Barr. As long as the factual pattern fell
within the Act's definition of racketeering activity, the statute was applicable
regardless of the failure to allege any connection with organized crime.
Like the Mandel court, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Campanale30 rejected the argument that OCCA required
evidence that those charged thereunder were engaged in organized crime. The
court reasoned that although the statute's title evidenced congressional
concern with organized crime, the statute in itself was broader.
With the exception of the Barr decision, courts have focused their
analyses on whether evidence of the proscribed conduct was present. The
racketeering activity outlined in the Act is meant to include those patterns of
24. Id. at 113.
25. See id. n.3 quoting statement of the Attorney General of the United States at Senate
Hearings.
26. 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976).
27. Such a requirement would probably be unconstitutional under Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
28. 415 F. Supp. at 1018.
29. Id. at 1019.
30. 518 F.2d 352, 363 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
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behavior and types of criminal activity characteristically associated with the
methods of organized crime. 31 Any conduct in that general category is
proscribed by OCCA. The cases indicate that whether a particular defendant
is alleged to be associated with organized crime is irrelevant to prosecution
under OCCA.
Comprehensiveness of the term "Any Enterprise"
According to the legislative history, the Act attempts to stop the flow of
money from organized crime activity into legitimate businesses by providing
that money derived from a pattern of racketeering cannot be used in acquiring
or maintaining an interest in any legitimate enterprise. 32 The express language
of the statute, however, does not include the word "legitimate." Rather, the
, The difficulty of
statute repeatedly uses the general term "any enterprise. 33
reconciling the legislative history and the statutory language on this point has
prompted several courts to hold that "any enterprise" includes both legiti34
mate business and wholly illegal endeavors.
United States v. Parness35 was the first case to interpret the meaning of
"any enterprise." The defendant appealed his conviction for acquiring an
enterprise affecting commerce through a pattern of racketeering in violation
of Title IX of OCCA. He argued that Congress did not intend the word
"enterprise" to include a foreign business, in this case a hotel corporation.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit summarily rejected this claim,
stating that the word "corporation" appeared in the definitions section of the
Act and that the legislative history indicated a congressional intent that the
statute be broadly construed.36 In addition, if the statute were restricted to
domestic business only, organized crime members need only invest abroad to
evade prosecution under the Act. The court reasoned that organized crime
affects the American economy whether the investment occurs in America or
abroad and, since the purpose of the statute is to protect the American
economy, foreign corporations in which racketeering money has been in37
vested are included within the definition of "any enterprise."
31. See United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1019 (D. Md. 1976).
32. See note 19 supra for text of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) which forbids the conducting of the
affairs of any enterprise "through a pattern of racketeering activity" (emphasis added). The
statutory language does not specify a requirement that the enterprise be infiltrated as suggested in
the legislative history.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), (b) and (c) (1970).
34. See United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Morris, 532
F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v.
Parness, 503 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); United States v.
Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
35. 503 F.2d 430, 439-40 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
36. Id. at 439.
37. In United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted the Second
Circuit's broad interpretation of the statute in United States v. Cappetto.38 In
Cappetto, a district court enjoined a wholly illegal gambling business
operating out of a billiards hall with the owner's knowledge and participation.
The defendants contended that the congressional purpose was to protect
legitimate business from the influence of racketeers and not to prohibit
racketeering activities, such as gambling, in themselves. In rejecting this
argument, the court found that the protection of legitimate business was only
one of the targets of Congress and that a more inclusive intent was to inhibit
any pattern of racketeering influencing interstate commerce. 3 9 The court
concluded that nothing in the definitions section or the prohibited activities
section of the Act suggested that the term "any enterprise" must be limited to
legitimate ones. 4° Consequently, the court held that an illegal gambling
business was included within the category of "any enterprise."
This reasoning was adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in United States v. Hawes,4 1 in which the court rejected appellants' position
42
that only legitimate business enterprises were contemplated by the statute.
The court found that the definition of enterprise included in the statute clearly
goes "beyond the scope of legitimate business activity. ,43 Defendants were
convicted of conspiring to participate in an illegal gambling enterprise,
consisting of the manufacture, sale, rental and operation of coin-operated
electrical machines used for gambling in violation of Georgia laws. The
defendants' argument was two-pronged: that illegitimate business was not
included under the Act, and that the allegedly infiltrated enterprise must be
44 In addition, the defendants
distinct from those persons associated with it.
argued that the statute as applied is constitutionally defective because those
reading it would not be put on notice that "any enterprise" included "those
1050 (1976), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that the Act was not
applicable to small business concerns.
38. 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). For a thorough
discussion of this case and the potential constitutional problems created by OCCA see Comment,
Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "Criminal
Activity," 124 U. PA. L. REV. 192 (1975).
39. In United States v. Castellano, 416 F. Supp. 125, 127-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), defendants
likewise depended on the legislative history to argue that the statute does not apply to wholly
illegal enterprises such as their association to loan money at usurious rates and to collect unlawful
debts. The court reiterated that the infiltration of legitimate businesses by racketeers was only
one of the targets of Congress in this enactment. Its more general concern was the influence of
organized crime on the American economy and, consequently, Congress accorded the word
"enterprise" a broad definition. Relying on Parness and Cappetto, the court denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss the indictments under the anti-racketeering statute.
40. 502 F.2d at 1358.
41. 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976).
42. Id. at 475.
43. Id. at 479.
44. In other words, "persons who by their association constitute an enterprise may not be
indicted for associating with that enterprise." Id.
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who participate in the affairs of their own organization. " 45 Citing the
Supreme Court standard for establishing unconstitutional vagueness, the
court found that a man of common intelligence would realize the possibility of
criminal liability for being part of any enterprise, even his own, through a
pattern of racketeering.' Enterprise, then, under Hawesincluded the conduct
of one's own business even though such a broad reading appears inconsistent
with the concept of infiltration inherent in the legislative history.
On the basis of the holding in Hawes, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the conviction of a professional gambler in United States v.
Morris.47 The court stated that in order to sustain such a conviction under title
IX the prosecution only had to prove "the defendant's association with an
'enterprise' and the existence of a 'pattern of racketeering activity.' "48 The
enterprise alleged in the indictment consisted of a group of three people
associated to defraud unsuspecting gamblers who had travelled to Nevada to
gamble legally. Since the statutory definition of enterprise includes any group
of individuals associated in fact, even if not as a legal entity, the court held
that the conspiracy of49three men constituted an enterprise and that the statute
was thus applicable.
Two years after its decision in Parness, the Second Circuit was again
faced with interpreting title IX of the Act in United States v. Altese.50 The
district court had held that title IX applied only to legitimate business and was
concerned with its infiltration by persons connected with organized crime.
Hence, the court had dismissed two counts of an indictment charging the
defendants with conducting a large scale gambling business "through a
pattern of racketeering activity and through the collection of [unlawful]
debts.''51 In reinstating the two counts, the Second Circuit relied on the
language of the Act which states "any enterprise" and not any "legitimate"
enterprise and on the clause directing that title IX "be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes.' '52 In concluding that such language indicates Congress "meant what it said," 53 the court joined the Campanale,
Cappetto, and Hawes courts in construing the term "enterprise" broadly.
Although four circuits have agreed that the statutory language takes
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976).
48. Id.at 441.
49. Id. at 442.
50. 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976).
51. Id.at 105.
52. Id.at 106. In deciding whether a governmental agency is an enterprise, the court in
United States v. Frumento, 405 F. Supp. 23, 30 (E.D. Pa. 1975), similarly noted that the
congressionally-mandated broad construction of the statute properly included wholly illegal

activity within the meaning of enterprise.
53. Id.
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precedence over congressional intent in construing the ambiguities regarding
the coverage of OCCA, the Altese dissent outlines an impressive argument
for the contrary interpretation. Judge Van Graafeiland maintained that
specific congressional direction is needed to extend the coverage of the Act
beyond legitimate enterprises. The provision authorizing liberal construction
of OCCA is not in itself sufficient justification for overriding the precise goal
of the statute to rid legitimate businesses of the menace of control by members
of organized crime.54 "A review of the legislative history of title IX leaves no
doubt that Congress never contemplated that 'enterprise' as used in §§ 1961,
1962 would extend beyond legitimate businesses or organizations." 55 To so
broadly construe enterprise when the proscribed activities are those "chargeable under any State law" 56 is an impermissible intrusion of federal law into
those areas traditionally relegated to the states, 57 according to the dissent.
Judge Van Graafeiland further pointed out that the Cappetto court was
misguided in its reliance on the legislative history to authorize an expansive
interpretation of the statute.5 8 The Cappettoopinion quoted language from the
legislative history of section 1955 which is not included in title IX. 59 Thus, by
implication, those circuits relying on Cappetto are making the same error.
While the legislative history of title IX is sparse, there is a clear indication of a
congressional intent to confine the statute to the infiltration of legitimate
businesses by organized crime members,' the dissent concluded.
Governmental Entities as Enterprises
The question of whether the government or a governmental entity is an
enterprise within the meaning of the Act has been litigated by two courts.
Conflicting decisions were reached in United States v. Mande161 and United
States v. Frumento.6 2 To substantiate their opinions, both courts relied on the
legislative history and on the language of the Act which defines enterprise as
"any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or any legal entity,
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
63
entity."
54. Id. at 107 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 108 (emphasis added).
56. Id. See note 4 supra.
57. Id. at 109.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. In United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975), the court noted that
"the legislative history ... provides the clearest indication that Congress intended 'enterprise'
to mean legitimate businesses." Id. at 58. However, the statute was held inapplicable on the basis
that there was only one action involved, the alleged arson of a business plant, and thus the
requisite pattern of racketeering activity was lacking.
61. 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976).
62. 405 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
63.

18 U.S.C. § 1%1(4) (1970).
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The defendant in Mandel was the Governor of Maryland. One count of
the indictment which the court dismissed alleged the state "to be an enterprise
within the meaning of the [anti-racketeering] statute. "I The factual allegation was that the defendant used his position as governor in a scheme to
defraud the citizens of the state. The Governor was charged with taking bribes
to influence the passage of legislation favorable to the other defendants,
owners of a race track. He was also charged with using his powers as governor
to procure state business for the other defendants. Finally, he was alleged to
have acquired and maintained a valuable financial interest65 in the Security
Investment Company with the money realized from the bribes.
The court engaged in a three-part analysis in deciding that neither the
Governor nor the state was an "enterprise." First, the court said that the focus
of the Act is organized crime activity in commerce according to the legislative
history. Consequently, "to read the word 'enterprise' as including public
entities would do violence to the plain purposes of Title IX."66 Second, the
absence of any consideration of governments and states as enterprises in the
legislative history of OCCA led the court to conclude that they were not
contemplated as included within the term "enterprise." Third, the remedies
provided 67 imply "that Congress had only private entities in mind when
defining 'enterprise.' "68 In addition, state laws regulating the conduct of
public officials safeguard the government from infiltration by organized
70
crime members, 69 the court noted.
In United States v. Frumento71 the court addressed the question of
whether a government agency is included within the definition of "enterprise" so as to fall within OCCA roverage. The defendant was a chief
investigator for the Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes in the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue, many of the activities of which affect interstate
commerce. 72 The acceptance of bribes in the position constituted his alleged
racketeering activity. 7" The court held that governmental agencies are enterprises. The court found authority for this decision in the statutory definition of
64. 415 F. Supp. at 1018.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1020.
67. See text accompanying notes 80-83 infra.
68. 415 F. Supp. at 1021.
69. Id.
70. The Mandel court held that the legislative history was significant on this issue, despite
the fact they had held that the statutory language dictated that no connection with organized
crime need be alleged to bring a cause of action under OCCA. Mandel, then, defines two narrow
constructions of the statute; one based on its language and the other on its legislative history.
Several other counts under OCCA in the indictment of Mandel were allowed to stand and will
be discussed later in this paper. See text accompanying notes 87-93 infra.
71. 405 F. Supp. 23, 29 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
72. Id. at 28.
73. Id.
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''enterprise" as including any "association, or other legal entity.
Support
was also found in the comments of Senator McClennan, the Act's principal
sponsor, that a primary consideration behind the legislation was to enable the
government to curtail the corruption of "the processes of our democratic
society." 7 The Frumentocourt noted that the term "organization" is often
used interchangably for the term "enterprise" throughout the legislative
history of the Act. The general term "organization" was interpreted to
include governmental agencies such as a tax bureau. The court further
reasoned that the congressional mandate that courts liberally construe the
statute "to effectuate its remedial purposes" 76 encouraged the adoption of a
broad definition of enterprise.
For the Mandel and Frumento courts, the legislative history and the
statutory language form the bases of contradictory holdings. Due to these
conflicting decisions it is unclear whether racketeering and corruption in
connection with governmental offices and agencies are subject to regulations
under OCCA.
Judicial decisions have established a liberal trend in interpreting the
scope of OCCA coverage based on the statutory language. "Any enterprise"
has been held to include foreign and domestic businesses, legitimate and
illegal endeavors, and conspiracies of private persons. One court has held that
governmental agencies and employees are covered. Despite the fact that the
name of the statute is the Organized Crime Control Act, settled case law
disposes of the argument that some connection with organized crime must be
established for a factual pattern to fall within OCCA's coverage. After
coverage has been established in a given case, courts are faced with the
problem of implementing the remainder of the statute.
',74

APPLICATION OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL REMEDIES

In applying the Act, courts have experienced the most difficulty with the
sections giving them jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. These are section
1963(b) criminal remedies and section 1964(a) civil remedies. The sections
empower courts to enter any order which would accomplish the goal of
removing the corrupting influence 77 of organized crime. However, both
sections are silent as to the standards to be employed in granting such
equitable relief. Thus, courts have turned to the legislative history and
statutory language for direction.
The Senate Report explicitly outlined the intended operational effect of
74. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
75. McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) Or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil
Liberties?, 46 N.D. LAW. 55, 141 (1970).
76. See note 20 supra.

77. See note 3 supra.
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offering both criminal and civil remedies to deal with the unlawful activities
of those engaged in organized crime. 78 If an organization had been acquired or
is being conducted
by defined racketeering methods, then the persons involved can be
legally separated from the organization, either by the criminal law
approach of fine, imprisonment and forfeiture, or through a civil
law approach of equitable relief broad enough to do all that is
necessary to free the channels of commerce from all illicit
activity. 79
However, the legislative history contains no guidance for obtaining the
desired effect. In fact, the sparse legislative history and limited debate on
these sections indicate little congressional appreciation of the problems courts
have subsequently encountered.
Title IX Remedies
The criminal penalties of OCCA are listed in section 1963 of title IX.
Subsection (a) authorizes the court to impose a $25,000 fine and/or a sentence
of twenty years imprisonment for a violation of section 1962. In addition,
upon conviction it requires the forfeiture 8° to the United States of any interest
or property acquired, maintained, or controlled in violation of the prohibited
activities section. Subsection (b) grants district courts jurisdiction "to enter
such restraining orders or prohibitions, or to take such other actions . . in
connection with any property or other interest subject to forfeiture under this
section, as it shall deem proper.' '81 Subsection (c) directs the Attorney
General to seize any property declared forfeited upon conviction, to provide
for its disposal, and to make "due provision for the rights of innocent
persons."82

The civil law approach codified in section 1964 authorizes appropriate
civil remedies including but not limited to those specifically listed in the
statute. Subsection (a) grants district courts jurisdiction to issue injunctions
requiring individuals to divest themselves of holdings in any enterprise
acquired as a result of violations of section 1962 and to refrain from engaging
in a like endeavor for a particular time period. Subsection (b) empowers the
Attorney General to bring actions under the statute in the district court.
Subsection (c) creates a cause of action for a private party injured as a result of
78. S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969).
79. Id.
80. Forfeiture is a common law remedy which has not been imposed in the United States
since 1790. 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1970) passed in the Act of April 20, 1790 by the First Congress
stated: "No conviction or judgment shall work corruption of blood or any forfeiture of estate."
OCCA effectively repeals 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1970) and is the first federal statute to employ the

penalty of forfeiture. See 1970 Hearings, note 11 supra, at 407.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1970).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1970).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

a section 1962 violation. Subsection (d) states that a judgment in favor of the
United States in a criminal suit estops the defendant from denying the same
allegations in a subsequent civil suit brought by the United States. Litigation
has focused upon the granting of injunctions pursuant to a criminal prosection
under section 1963(b) or to a civil action under section 1964(a).
Section 1963(b) Injunctions
Two cases which involved petitions for injunctions pursuant to section
1963(b) to restrain the use of property pending disposition on the merits are
United States v. Mandel8 3 and United States v. Lipman.8 4 Both the Mandel
and Lipman courts adhered to civil standards8 5 to govern the hybrid situation
created by OCCA of restraint in a criminal prosecution prior to conviction.
This approach. resulted in a restrictive interpretation of when an injunction
could properly be issued pursuant to the criminal remedies section of OCCA.
Case law has established that there are four factors which must be
considered in determining whether to grant equitable relief pursuant to rule 65
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 8 6 These are that the movant
demonstrate that he is likely to prevail at a trial on the merits; that irreparable
harm will take place if an injunction is not granted; that there will be no
significant injury to innocent parties; and that an injunction is in the public
interest. In applying OCCA, the last two considerations pose no difficulties
since subsection (c) of section 1963 protects innocent third parties and it is in
the public interest to remove legitimate business from the control of organized
crime and to safeguard the integrity of the criminal justice system. The
Mandel and Lipman courts' analyses in applying the first two considerations
highlight the difficulties in the implementation of section 1963(b) consistent
with the congressional intent that title IX not be defeated.
In Mandel, the facts significant to granting an injunction indicate that the
Governor of Maryland was charged with acquiring and maintaining a substantial financial interest in the Security Investment Company in violation of the
Act. 8 7 The defendant denied owning any of the interests described in the
indictment. 8 8 The government moved for an order to restrain "the transfer or
other disposition by defendants of any property or other interests which would
be subject to forfeiture upon conviction. "89
83. 408 F. Supp. 679 (D. Md. 1976).
84. No. 76-96 (N.D. Il1. July 22, 1976).
85. See Conservation Council of N.C. v. Costanzo, 505 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974); First
Citizen Bank & Trust Co. v. Camp, 432 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1970).

86. FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (1966).
87. For a complete discussion of the Mandel facts, see text accompanying notes 64-65
supra.
88. 408 F. Supp. at 681.
89. Id. at 680.
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In denying the petition, the Mandel court held that an indictment
composed of only conclusory allegations is insufficient to meet the requirement of demonstrating petitioner's likelihood of success at trial 90 to justify the
issuance of an injunction. To succeed in a criminal prosecution, it is necessary
to convince a jury of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus,
some indication of the government's ability to meet this burden of proof must
be offered at the hearing for the preliminary injunction. However, according
to Mandel, a judicial finding that the government would be likely to prevail at
trial based on whatever evidence "constitutes a pretrial determination that the
defendants are probably guilty." 9 ' Such a determination is prejudicial to the
constitutional right to a fair trial. Hence, the Mandel court stated that to issue
a section 1963(b) injunction "would be incompatible with the presumption of
innocence defendants enjoy until such time, if ever, as a jury finds them guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt."92 Although the court limited its holding to the
facts in Mandel,93 it is difficult to imagine any situation in which this rationale
for denying an injunction in a criminal proceeding would not be applicable.
The Lipman court likewise held that the indictment alone was not
adequate to support a section 1963(b) injunction but based its conclusion on
different reasoning. In Lipman, the defendants were involved in a scheme to
receive kickbacks in connection with supplying drugs and services charged to
Medicare to residents of a nursing home in violation of title IX.94 The court
found that the issuance of an injunction to freeze the defendants' assets in the
nursing home solely on the basis of the indictment would constitute a denial of
due process protection which guarantees a judicial hearing prior to even a
temporary deprivation of a property interest. 95 The court rejected the government's argument that the grand jury's finding of probable cause substituted
for a hearing and satisified due process requirements. The Lipman court
reasoned that grand jury proceedings do not offer the accused the opportunity
to confront witnesses and introduce evidence necessary to insure its judicial
nature. Thus, they cannot function as a substitute for an adversary hearing the
outcome of which might affect the property rights of the accused.
The court found support for its holding in the statutory language. The
96
Act provides that the court can enter such orders "as it shall deem proper."
To make the determination as to what is proper, an evidentiary hearing is
essential. As the court noted:
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 683.
Id.

Id.
Id.at 684.
No. 76-96, slip op. at 1.
Id.at 53.
18 U.S.C. § 1%3(b) (1970).
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To interpret the statute as the government does, to allow the entry
of an injunction on the bare showing that an indictment has been
returned which claims that certain property is subject to forfeiture,
would be tantamount to reading judicial discretion out of § 1963(b)
and requiring the entry of an injunction in every case. 97
Finally, the court reasoned that the hearing should be "surrounded by even
greater procedural protections" 98 than one required for a civil taking because
the consequences of the pending criminal charge are potentially greater. An
indictment alone, then, cannot support a section 1963(b) injunction.
After applying the first criterion for likelihood of success on the merits
outlined in the rule 65 approach to granting injunctions, the Mandel and
Lipman courts analyzed the second factor customarily considered in such
cases: impending irreparable harm absent injunctive relief. The Mandelcourt
interpreted the legislative history of OCCA to necessitate less stringent
evidence of irreparable harm to obtain a section 1963(b) injunction than is
ordinarily required under rule 65. Since the purpose of a section 1963(b)
injunction is to prevent change in the present status of property ownership or
interest prior to conviction so that the forfeiture provision cannot be defeated,
the court concluded that the only harm that need be shown is the threat of
imminent transfer. However, in Mandel, the government failed to offer such
evidence and consequently an injunction was not issued. The Lipman court
thought that the mere possibility that the defendants might be able to defeat
the purposes of title IX if not restrained from divesting themselves of their
property constituted potential irreparable harm in itself. Thus, both courts
seem to indicate that evidence of a current intended transfer of rights in
property which might be subject to forfeiture would be persuasive in obtaining an injunction pursuant to section 1963(b), provided the problems of
the dilution of the presumption of innocence, on which Mandel was decided,
and the potential violation of due process, which the Lipman court articulated, could be overcome.
These two critical concerns indicate reasons issuance of an injunction
should not be automatic with an indictment. However, they need not always
preclude equitable relief. The adoption of rule 65 civil standards, though,
even as the minimum criteria as suggested by the Mandel court, is, in effect,
an automatic denial of the injunction and tantamount to a defeat of title IX. In
using this approach, courts lose sight of the fact that the reason for the section
1963(b) injunction provision in the Act is to prevent title IX from being
defeated. 99 The application of the rule 65 civil standards method of granting
injunctions in these cases is unduly restrictive in that it does not allow the
97. No. 76-%, slip op. at 55.
98. Id. at 54.
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1970). See also note 12 supra.
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court the latitude necessary to take into account additional factors. These
include the facts that procedures have been developed to deal effectively with
the concerns which the Mandel and Lipman courts isolated and that the
indictment commands significant respect in the criminal justice system.
The language of section 1963 implies that the purpose of an injunction
pursuant to that section is to preserve the jurisdiction of the court over
property subject to forfeiture upon conviction.10 ° Consequently, the only
relevant inquiry is whether any threat of transfer of property is present which
would defeat jurisdiction prior to a final determination of the case.10 ' Rule
7(c)(2) of the 1972 Amendment to Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 10 2 which is directed specifically to Title IX of OCCA, provides
guidelines for implementing the forfeiture provision. The rule states that
"[w]hen an offense charged may result in a criminal forfeiture, the indictment
or the information shall allege the extent of the interest or property subject to
forfeiture." 10 3 The Amendment manifests a congressional intent that the
forfeiture provision of OCCA be implemented.
Rules 31 and 32(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 10 4 can
be interpreted to provide safeguards against the dilution of the presumption of
innocence in a section 1963(b) case. The rules provide for a special jury
finding and judgment authorizing seizure of forfeited property. 105 Specifically, rule 31 (e) states "a special verdict shall be returned as to the extent of the
interest or property subject to forfeiture, if any." '0 Since an injunction would
be granted only in those cases in which forfeiture was the desired remedy and
a special verdict, which almost always means a jury trial, is required for
forfeiture, any prejudice from a preliminary injunction is not critical, for the
100. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1970).
101. The requirement of likelihood of success at a trial on the merits is of minimal
importance in an injunction in a criminal prosecution since once the indictment is entered, the
case proceeds to trial.
102. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2) (1975). The notes of the Advisory Committee on the 1972
amendment state that "Subsection (c)(2) is new. It is intended to provide procedural implementation of the recently enacted criminal forfeiture provision of the Organized Crime Act of 1970 Title
IX section 1963."
103. Id.: "Under the common law, in a criminal forfeiture proceeding, the defendant was
apparently entitled to notice, trial, and a special jury finding on the factual issues surrounding a
declaration of forfeiture which followed his criminal conviction. Subsection (c)(2) provides for
notice."
104. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e) as amended effective Oct. 1, 1972 states: "If the indictment or
the information alleges that an interest or property is subject to criminal forfeiture, a special
verdict shall be returned as to the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture, if any."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(2) provides: "When a verdict contains a finding of property subject to
a criminal forfeiture, the judgment of criminal forfeiture shall authorize the Attorney General to
seize the interest or property subject to forfeiture, fixing such terms and conditions as the court
shall deem proper."

105. See note 102 supra.
106.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e) as drafted assumes that the amount of the interest or property

subject to criminal forfeiture is an element of the offense.
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fact that an injunction had been issued would not be known to the jurors. In the
rare instance that a bench trial would take place pursuant to sections 1962 and
1963 of the Act, the presumption of the judge's ability to separate his
professional judgment in sentencing from other extraneous information is
operative.
The due process argument diminishes in importance in view of the fact
that the Act sought to be implemented is a criminal statute. For example,
adequate precedent exists in criminal law for impounding evidence and the
fruits of crime without a hearing pending trial'0 7 and for the use of injunctions. 10' Finally, an indictment, in itself, is significant. It imposes reasonable
restrictions on a person's liberty. 109 The accused may be presumed innocent
but he may be imprisoned nevertheless. If released on bail, he may not leave
the jurisdiction of the court without prior approval. This is the same type of
control which section 1963(b) of OCCA seeks to provide over property.
The civil standards approach for granting a rule 65 injunction, adopted
by both the Mandel and Lipmancourts, seems unduly limited and predictably
results in denial of an injunction. A more reasonable standard for issuing an
injunction pursuant to section 1963(b) would seem to be to require some
evidence of the present intent to transfer an interest in property and an
indictment alleging the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture
in accordance with rule 7(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Such an approach would serve to implement the legislative intent of the
criminal remedies provision of OCCA.
Section 1964(a) Injunctions
The criteria used in granting an injunction pursuant to rule 65 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the Mandel and Lipman courts
adopted to analyze section 1963(b) criminal cases, seem appropriate for the
issuance of an injunction sought pursuant to the civil remedies section. Yet,
United States v. Cappetto11° and United States v. Winstead,11 ' two cases
brought under section 1964(a), do not adopt this reasoning.
Cappetto establishes the Seventh Circuit's test for imposing injunctions
pursuant to section 1964(a). The district court had preliminarily enjoined the
107. -Cf. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1305 and 1703 provisions for impoundment and forfeiture in customs
law.
108. See People v. Barney Lonzo, No. 74-775 (Chicago Mun. Ct., filed May 23, 1975), in
which a cease and desist order enjoining the states attorney's office from issuing subpoenas for
people to appear when there was no court date was entered. The order also provided that copies
be sent to the chief of the criminal division to facilitate compliance.
109. Subsequent to an indictment the accused may post bond if he is able, but the conditions
of bond still restrict his liberty.
110. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
111. 421 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. II1. 1976).
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defendants from continuing their alleged gambling activities in violation of
section 1962 of title IX and the appellate court affirmed. The defendants had
argued that any action under section 1964 was basically criminal since the
complaint had had to allege illegal activitigs to trigger its application and that
the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to defendants in criminal cases
should be operative. 112 These rights include the standard of proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, which is denied if an injunction is entered on
alleged conduct only.
The court noted that a civil proceeding to enjoin acts which Congress has
authorized prosecutors to make the subject of either a civil or a criminal
proceeding or both is not "rendered criminal in character by the fact that the
acts are also punishable as crimes." ' 1 3 Consequently, constitutional
safeguards were held not to apply. 114 The Cappettocourt reasoned that, since
"section 1964 provides for a civil action in which only equitable relief can be
granted, ' ' "l 5 it followed that civil standards should govern. However, the
court did not apply the four criteria outlined for civil injunctions. Instead, the
Cappetto court analysis was in terms of burden of proof.
The traditional civil burden of proof is whether all the facts and
circumstances taken together tend to establish that it is more likely that the
incident occurred than that it did not. The Cappetto court used this definition
to establish its test: "whether a preponderance of the evidence shows a
likelihood that the defendants will commit wrongful acts in the future" 116 as
the standard by which conduct will be enjoined. This standard permits the
inference that criminal conduct will occur in the future to be drawn on the
basis of alleged past criminal behavior which has not been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Even so, the court emphasized that the "standard of proof
is lower in a civil proceeding than it is in a criminal proceeding." 117 Thus the
Cappetto standard for granting a section 1964(a) civil injunction is whether
the alleged conduct will continue if it is not enjoined. 11 8 Based on that
standard, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction against future gambling activities.
Winstead" 9 applied the Cappetto standard but denied a temporary
112. See Comment, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil
Remedies for "Criminal Activity," 124 U. PA. L. REV. 192, 215 (1975).
113. 502 F.2d at 1357.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1358.
117. Id. at 1357.
118. The Cappetto court interpreted section 1964 as a waiver of the requirement of a
showing of irreparable harm which the Mandel and Lipman courts had seen as paramount in the
issuance of a section 1963(b) injunction. The court reasoned that the activities proscribed by
section 1962 were inherently injurious to the public and thus could be enjoined without specific
evidence of irreparable harm. Id. at 1358.
119. 421 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. II1. 1976).
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restraining order. In Winstead, the defendants had been operating a policy
wheel. The Cappettotest required that evidence of the likelihood of continued
120
violations be "established by inferences drawn from past conduct."'
Despite evidence of considerable gambling activity and arrests of defendants
for possession of gambling paraphernalia six months previously, the court
held that the information was out of date. In the absence of current data, an
inference that an injunction was needed to terminate the illegal activity could
not be drawn. In the case of a gambling wheel operation, a six-month time lag
was not considered current.
Under section 1964(a) courts are faced with continuous surveillance of
their orders. There is no indication in the legislative history that Congress
intended to impose such a burden on courts. Given these facts and the lack of
specific criteria for judging the propriety of injunctive relief, courts are not
likely to impose section 1964(a) remedies unless the statute and the legislative
intent clearly mandate them in a given situation.
What Congress sought to accomplish by the Act was to provide legislation which would check the spread of organized crime in a manner similar to
the way in which the Sherman Antitrust Act, 1 2 1 as amended by the Clayton
Act, 122 precludes the development of monopolies. Consequently, the concept
of providing dual remedies within the context of both civil and criminal suits
was borrowed from antitrust laws,' 23 in which the approach had proven
effective. Antitrust laws do offer the possibility of two suits and both criminal
and civil remedies for the same factual situation. Criminal penalties include
fine and imprisonment but not forfeiture. Since there is no provision for
forfeiture in the antitrust laws, there is no need for an OCCA section 1963(b)
type injunction in a criminal suit to keep the statute from being defeated. Civil
remedies provide for an injunction in a suit by a private party ordering
divestiture and enjoining specific activities. 124 Many of the concerns which
the courts have considered in deciding whether to grant injunctions pursuant
to litigations under either sections 1963(b) or 1964(a) have been addressed in
120.
121.
(1970)).

502 F.2d at 1358.
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7

122. Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13,
14-21, 22-27, 44 and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53 (1970)).
123. See note 13 supra.
124. 15 U.S.C.A. § 26 (1976) provides for injunctive relief for private parties:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have
injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties,
against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws, including
sections 13, 14, 18, and 19 of this title, when and under the same conditions and
principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage
is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings, and upon
the execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted
and a showing that the danger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary
injunction may issue . . ..
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antitrust cases with similar results. Antitrust case law has established that
preliminary injunctions require a showing of irreparable harm.' 25 The showing of imminent activity suggested as a criterion by the Mandel and Lipman
courts, has been held to be required for an injunction pursuant to antitrust
law. 126 The plaintiff must demonstrate that the accused has violated or intends
to violate antitrust laws threatening him with loss or injury. 127 As in
Winstead, courts have refused to enter an injunction on a showing of prior
criminal activity without some indication of a danger of recurrence. 128 In
addition, damage provisions of the Clayton Act have been held not to be
criminal and therefore constitutional safeguards of a criminal proceeding
29

have been denied. 1

The statutory schemes under antitrust laws and OCCA are the same, but
application of the dual remedy approach in the area of organized crime control
has not been as successful. Research has not disclosed a situation closely
analogous to the one OCCA creates. Consequently, there is little authority on
which to ground an interpretation. However, one of the problems in implementing OCCA to the fullest extent might be contained in the statutory
language. The lack of standards in the Act itself by which to judge the
propriety of equitable relief under OCCA has caused courts to hestitate to
enter injunctions. Failure to obtain injunctions, in turn, renders civil suits
under OCCA idle and the criminal forfeiture penalty useless. If there is no
provision for a sanction which runs to the benefits procured as a result of a
pattern of racketeering, members of organized crime profit from their illegal
activities and the congressional intent of OCCA is not carried out. It may be
possible to avoid such a result.
A section 1964(a) civil injunction, as allowed in Cappetto, could be
granted in those cases meeting the Cappetto test of likelihood of continuing
criminal activity as established by a preponderance of the evidence. The
Winstead court adds the requirement of current data which is consistent with
court decisions in antitrust litigation.' 30 An alternative approach would be to
utilize the guidelines developed for rule 65 injunctions as demonstrated in
Mandel and Lipman.
Although a section 1963(b) civil injunction is sought within a criminal
prosecution, it is nonetheless civil, and criminal safeguards do not apply.
However, criminal procedures provide the court with various possibilities
from which to develop standards for injunctions. Guidance for implementa125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit Co., 476 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1973).
Id.
Id.at 993.
United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 331 (1952).
Herald Co. v. Harper, 410 F.2d 125, 129-30 (8th Cir. 1969).
Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit Co., 476 F.2d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1973).
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tion of this section is included in the 1972 Amendment to Rule 7 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. In addition to listing the interest in property
subject to forfeiture, the indictment could be drafted to include those facts
probative of the possibilities of immediate transfer of such property, a
criterion on which all the courts have agreed. The indictment would include
sufficient facts to meet the burden of proof regarding possible transfer,
whatever that might be. The standard of proof for the indictment itself is
probable cause. While courts differ as to how '.'probable cause" equates with
other burdens such as "preponderance of the evidence," it is definitely less
than a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard or there would be no need for a
trial. Once entered, the consequences of an indictment over persons are
comparable to the consequences of an injunction over property sought
pursuant to section 1963(b) of OCCA. Both restrict the thing involved, the
person or the property, within the jurisdiction of the court prior to proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. An injunction is no more a dilution of the
31
presumption of innocence than is the indictment itself.1
CONCLUSION

Few cases have been brought pursuant to OCCA since its passage in
1970. A survey of those cases reveals two problem areas in the Act's
application-interpretation of the scope of coverage and implementation of
the remedies sections. The first problem has been solved by a liberal
interpretation of the statutory language regarding coverage. "Any enterprise" means both legitimate and illegal endeavors run by racketeering
methods. Despite the legislative history, there is no need to show an
infiltration of the enterprise or a connection with organized crime. The second
problem has not been completely resolved. In the absence of any guidance in
the legislative history or the statutory language from which to formulate a
method of applying the remedies sections, courts have had to devise their
own.
Courts seeking to implement a section 1964(a) injunction in a civil suit
have developed a test based on a preponderance of the evidence standard.
Courts asked to enter a section 1963(b) injunction in a criminal case have
utilized Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure criteria. The
application of this approach results in a narrow framework within which a
section 1963(b) injunction would be operative. Since courts entering section
1964(a) civil remedies injunctions have not turned to rule 65 civil standards,
courts asked to enter a section 1963(b) injunction in a criminal suit should not
feel compelled to do so.
131. In the event an unlawful seizure occurs, parties could seek to recover compensation in
the Court of Claims. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1495 (1973).
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Consistent with the liberal trend in resolving the coverage question, a
less rigid approach toward implementing the remedies sections is in order.
Some direction might be found in the procedural aspects of criminal litigation. It is essential to formulate a standard compatible with the needs of
criminal law and the purpose of the Act. Uniform standards to be used in
granting injunctive relief under the Organized Crime Control Act are essential
if the purpose and promise of the Act are to be fulfilled.
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